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Abstract
Part I of this Comment will discuss briefly the cases in which the defenses have been asserted.
Part I will examine the underlying policies of each defense. In Part II of this Comment each of the
defenses will be applied separately to the facts of a recent antitrust case, In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation. Finally, in Part III, the application of the separatist approach to those facts will be
critiqued, and an alternative approach to the defenses will be discussed.

DEFENSES TO INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
SUITS: AN AGGREGATE APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application1 of the United States antitrust
has focused the attention of jurists and academics on the act
of state, foreign sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign compullaws 2

1. "Extraterritorial application," as employed in this Comment, refers to the extension
of United States antitrust laws to foreign defendants whose illegal conduct takes place, either
in whole or in part, outside the territorial United States.
The only case in which a United States court exercised jurisdiction over parties whose
illegal conduct took place wholly outside of the United States is United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The case is famous for enunciating the "effects"
doctrine which confers jurisdiction on a United States court when any of the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct has an effect within the territorial United States.
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch,
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States . . . . Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within the United
States; and it follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, though
made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them.
Id. at 443-44 (emphasis added).
Most of the cases in which the antitrust laws have been applied extraterritorially have
had some portion of the allegedly violative conduct take place within the United States. See
generally Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(Canadian acts took place partly within the United States); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (United States corporation part owner of British conspirator); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (combination entered into in
United States); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (domestic corporation involved in conspiracy); United States v.
Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (illegal acts committed in
United States); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd,
332 U.S. 319 (1947) (conspiracy entered into in United States).
The Alcoa "effects" test has recently been criticized by cases which seek to apply a more
comprehensive balancing approach. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976). This controversy surrounding the proper test for jurisdiction remains
unsettled. For a more in depth discussion of the jurisdictional difficulties surrounding the
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws, see generally, B. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 19-78 (1979);
Davidow, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law in a ChangingWorld, 8 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 895 (1976); Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication of
the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Simson, The Return of American Banana: A
ContemporaryPerspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 233 (1974);
Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View
From Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976); Recent
Development, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 354 (1977).
2. The major antitrust laws are: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976); The Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1976); and The
Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
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sion defenses which are frequently asserted in the context of international antitrust litigation. Historically, United States courts have
applied and analyzed each defense individually. 3 It has been suggested that this method is required by the different policies underlying each defense. 4 This separatist approach can lead to the anomalous situation in which an innocent defendant being unable to meet
the requirements of each defense will be subjected to antitrust
liability. 5 In such a situation, the separatist approach is inappropriate because it fails to recognize the policy considerations underlying the defenses.
Part I of this Comment will discuss briefly the cases in which
the defenses have been asserted. Part I will examine the underlying
policies of each defense. In Part II of this Comment each of the
defenses will be applied separately to the facts of a recent antitrust
case, In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.' Finally, in Part III, the
application of the separatist approach to those facts will be critiqued, and an alternative approach to the defenses will be discussed.
I. THE DEFENSES
A. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is not mandated by the Constitution
or by international law. 7 Rather, it is a product of federal common
3. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of
state); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (sovereign
immunity); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (act
of state); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977)
(act of state); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976) (act of state); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (sovereign
immunity) International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.
553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a fd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-645
(U.S. Nov. 9, 1981). (district court discussed sovereign immunity; circuit court discussed act
of state). The only case in which foreign sovereign compulsion has been successfully argued is
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970).
4. Comment, Defenses to Actions Against Foreign States Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 583, 656-61 (1979). Accord B. HAWK, supra note 1, at 27
(Supp. 1981).
5. Conversely, an admittedly guilty defendant could escape liability simply by meeting
the mechanical requirements of one defense.
6. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
7. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964). The doctrine
does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. Id. at 423. "It arises out of the basic
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law, 8 created to "maintain a certain stability and predictability in
transnational transactions, to avoid friction between nations, to
encourage settlement of these disputes through diplomatic means
and to avoid interference with the executive control of foreign
relations." 9 The act of state doctrine achieves these goals by barring adjudication acts by foreign governments in United States
courts. 10
The policies which prompted Chief Justice Fuller to first articulate the doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez" were respect for
sovereigns and the preservation of the dignity of nations.1 2 In
applying the doctrine, he stated:
[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
13
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

This rigid approach survived for over fifty years until the Court
decided Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'4 The Sabbatino
Court, "rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It
concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations." Id.
8. The act of state doctrine is not codified in any statute but rather was judicially
developed. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
9. 376 U.S. at 447 (White, J., dissenting). See Note, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the
Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1977); Comment, Sherman Act
Litigation: A Modern Generic Approach to Objective TerritorialJurisdiction and the Act of
State Doctrine, 84 DicK. L. REv. 645, 654 (1980); Comment, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 97, 101
(1978).
10. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1937); Shapleigh
v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
11. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
12. Id. at 254. Implicitly, the Court could not infringe upon the acts of a foreign
sovereign government without offending the sovereignty of that nation.
13. Id. at 252.
14. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In 1960, respondents Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted with an
American owned, Cuban based company, Compania Azuearera Vertientes-Camaquey de
Cuba (CAV), for the purchase of Cuban sugar. Shortly after this agreement was reached,
Congress reduced the import quota for Cuban sugar. In reaction to this Congressional action,
the Cuban government expropriated CAV's property and assigned the contract rights to
Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional brought an action to recover on the assigned rights from
Sabbatino, CAV's temporary receiver. Sabbatino defended against the suit on the ground
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all-encompassing rule," 15 balanced relevant factors including: (1)
the degree of international consensus in the specific area of the law
involved in the claim; (2) the importance of the issue raised by the
action juxtaposed with United States foreign policy; and (3)
whether the challenged government remained in existence.16 Applying these considerations to the facts before it, the Court held that
the act of state doctrine barred any adjudication of the validity of
the Cuban expropriation.1 7 The Court limited its holding, stating
"we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government .. . even if the complaint alleges that the

taking violates customary international law." 1 8
The Sabbatino approach reflects a shift in the Court's focus
from concern for embarrassment of the Executive in foreign policy
matters to the separation of powers.' 9 Post-Sabbatinocourts have
consistently accepted this policy view, which is more concerned
with protecting the separation of powers than the dignity of foreign
sovereigns. 20 Although courts agree on the policy underlying the
act of state doctrine, they disagree on the manner of its application.
Some courts take a rigid approach reminiscent of Underhill2 l while
22
others employ the Sabbatino balance of relevant considerations.
that Cuba's expropriation violated international law and that Banco Nacional, therefore, did
not validly hold the rights upon which the action was based. Banco Nacional argued that the
act of state doctrine precluded the Court from judging the validity of Cuba's act. The district
court found that the acts violated international law and granted summary judgment for the
respondents. The circuit court affirmed. Id. at 401-07.
15. Id. at 428.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Court found that no international consensus regarding expropriation existed, and that the issues involved were of great importance to United States foreign policy.
These findings coupled with the finding that the expropriating Cuban government was still in
existence led the Court to hold as it did. Id. at 428-39.
18. Id. at 428.
19. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. See generally International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), appeal docketed, No. 81-645 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co., 550 F.2d 68
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T.
& S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a f'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
21. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aJJ'd per
curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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The tension between the Underhill and Sabbatino approaches
is apparent in the antitrust cases involving the act of state doctrine.
The doctrine was first applied in an antitrust context to bar judicial
review of a Costa Rican seizure allegedly induced by the plaintiff's
competitor in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 2 3 Ameri22. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co., v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976).
The Sabbatino Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e), was enacted immediately after the
Supreme Court's decision. It provides that in expropriation cases:
"[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law. . .[unless] the President determines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States ....
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).The President, therefore, could control the application of the
doctrine in foreign expropriation cases which violate international law.
The problem of Executive influence in the act of state doctrine also arises in the so called
"Bernstein Exception." The "Bernstein Exception" states that the act of state doctrine bars
judicial review unless the Executive clearly states otherwise. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1949); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frbres Soci6t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). The propriety of the exception was not discussed in Sabbatino
and is as yet unsettled. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972) (a plurality decision regarding the propriety of the exception).
Finally, a third issue surrounding the act of state doctrine is whether there is a commercial activity exception. The Justice Department has taken the position that the defense does
not apply to the commercial activities of a foreign government. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 54-55 (1977). The Justice Department
relies on the case of Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
in support of its position. This means that the act of state doctrine would not be available as a
defense in situations in which the foreign government was engaged in a commercial activity.
Professor Hawk suggests that the Department's reliance on Dunhill is misplaced. B. HAWK
supra note 1, at 133. "[A]t least five, and possibly six of the Justices on the Supreme Court
have indicated that they would not as a rule apply the commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine." Id. Professor Hawk suggests a possible solution to the commercial
activity exception issue:
Perhaps the best solution is to treat the commercial or non-commercial aspect of the
foreign sovereign action as one consideration in a balancing of interests approach to
determine whether the act of state doctrine applies, rather than applying the
commercial activity limitation as rigid standard. While the commercial aspect of
the action may favor application of the antitrust laws, other factors may be present
which implicate considerations outweighing the United States' interest in application of this antitrust laws in a particular foreign situation.
Id.
23. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). American Banana alleged that United Fruit had induced the
Costa Rican military to seize part of American Banana's plantation and cargo. The plaintiff
also alleged that this action was in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize the production
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can Banana represents a mechanistic approach to the act of state
doctrine. 24 The Court did not engage in any policy analysis in
reaching its decision; rather it merely restated the Underhill rule in
territorial terms. 25 Although its precedential value has been questioned,26 American Banana continues to be cited whenever the act
of state doctrine is invoked .27
The most recent antitrust case to follow the mechanistic approach to act of state is Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.28 The plaintiff,
Hunt, alleged that the defendant oil companies had violated section
2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to provoke Libya into nationalizing all of Hunt's Libyan assests. The district court held that the
adjudication of Hunt's claim would "require inquiry into acts and
conduct of Libyan officials, Libyan affairs and Libyan policies
.... 29 The court refused to engage in such an inquiry.30 Writ3a
ing for the Second Circuit, Judge Mulligan affirmed on appeal.
The plaintiff, Hunt, asked the court to examine Libya's motivation in nationalizing Hunt's assets. 32 Judge Mulligan effectively
and exportation of bananas from Central America. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the
suit on two grounds: (1) the act of state doctrine and (2) by refusing to extend the Sherman
Act to conduct which occurs wholly outside of the United States. Id. at 355-57.
24. See 376 U.S. at 416.

25. 213 U.S. at 357-58.
26. American Banana has been criticized primarily for its approach to the jurisdictional
issue. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1976); Conservation Counsel of W. Austl., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp.
270, 274 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
27. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977); Tabaclera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 712
(5th Cir. 1968); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 109
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950

(1972).
28. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). The Libyan government
permitted oil companies, including Hunt's, to explore and produce crude oil in Libya. In
1970, Libya increased its "take" of crude oil from all Libyan producers. In 1971, Libya again
attempted to increase its "take." The defendants and Hunt met to discuss the formation of a
"united front" against Libya. The parties agreed, after receiving Justice Department consent,
that no individual producer would make concessions to Libya without the consent of the
others. In addition, if Libya cut back on the production of one party, the others would share
the burden equally. In 1972, Libya demanded an increased "take" and 51% ownership of
Hunt's equity. Hunt, relying on the agreement, resisted the demands. Libya terminated
Hunt's concession and nationalized all of Hunt's assets. Hunt filed suit against the defendants,
alleging that they had conspired to provoke Libya's nationalization in order to drive Hunt out
of competition in the Middle East. Id. at 70-72.
29. 410 F. Supp. 10, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
30. Id. at 25.
31. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
32. Id. at 78.
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foreclosed any possibility that act of state would permit a motivational inquiry. He stated, "while the skilled pleader here has meticulously attempted to avoid the issue of validity [of the nationalization], its claim is admittedly not viable unless the judicial branch
examines the motivation of the Libyan action and that inevitably
involves its validity." 33 The language 34is a clear reaffirmation, if
not an extension, of American Banana.
The court found Libya's actions to be genuine acts of a foreign
35
sovereign, thereby eliminating the need for any further analysis.
By refusing to adjudicate Hunt's claim the court effectively protected the separation of powers. This result was acknowledged by
the court, through not specifically analyzed as a basis for the deci36
sion.

33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. American Banana did not address the possibility of a motivational inquiry. Hunt
extends the act of state doctrine to the motivation underlying the foreign acts. Currently,
under Hunt, a court cannot examine the validity or the motivation underlying the foreign
act. See id. at 78 n.14.
35. The Hunt court did not discuss the possibility of affording Hunt relief once it had
determined that the Libyan act was an act of state. Id. at 79. A genuine act of state is one in
which the government gives effect to its public interests. See infra note 50 and accompanying
text.
36. 550 F.2d at 77-78. The Hunt court acknowledged that there was a political problem
involved in the decision but considered that problem only for the purpose of mechanically
applying the act of state doctrine. Id. at 73. The court did not engage in any interest analysis.
One court has suggested that "[t]he act of state doctrine is similar to the political
question doctrine in domestic law. It requires that the courts defer to the legislative and
executive branches when those branches are better equipped to resolve a politically sensitive
question." International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1358 (9th Cir.), appeal docketed, No.81-645 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981). The circuit court in
OPEC, the facts of which are discussed infra, notes 88-90, concentrated on the separation of
powers consideration in applying act of state. However, Judge Choy writing for the court
stated that "[1]ike the political question doctrine, [the] applicability [of the act of state
doctrine] is not subject to clear definition. The courts balance various factors to determine
whether the doctrine should apply." Id. at 1358-59. If Judge Choy is correct, then, while
separation of powers might be the major consideration underlying act of state, it is not the
sole one.
This implies that the court should also examine the factors involved in a political
question analysis in order to determine whether the act of state doctrine should apply in a
given situation. These factors are enunciated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). A
court would have to examine whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, whether there is a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue, whether it is impossible to
decide the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion, whether the court's undertaking the resolution of the issue will show disrespect
toward another branch of the government, whether there is an unusual need for strict
adherence to a political decision already made and whether there is potential for political
embarassment. Id.
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Other courts have refused to take such an approach, preferring

to address each policy consideration individually in light of the facts
in each case. 37 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
N. T. & S.A. ,38 the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 39 by obtaining a Honduran
court order preventing Timberlane from operating its Honduran
based lumbermill. 40 These actions were allegedly in furtherance of
a conspiracy to drive Timberlane out of the Honduran lumber
market. 41 The district court dismissed the suit under the act of
state doctrine. 42 The circuit court vacated and remanded. 43 Judge
Choy, writing for the Ninth Circuit, rejected any possibility that
the act of state doctrine would be applicable solely because a foreign government was involved. 44 The court held that the applicability of the defense depended upon a balancing of all relevant
considerations. 45 The court acknowledged that judicial interference with foreign relations was a major consideration but stated
that as the importance of the issue to foreign policy decreased, the
argument favoring judicial involvement became more compel-

ling.

46

37. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
38. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane had purchased its Honduran lumber mill
from a family heavily in debt. Timberlane alleged that the defendants refused to allow
Timberlane to settle the debts of the mill. Rather, defendants obtained a Honduran court
order preventing the sale of the mill and subsequently preventing Timberlane from operating
it.
39. Id. at 600.
40. Id. at 604-05.
41. id.
42. Id. at 600.
43. Id. at 601.
44. Id. at 606.
45. Id. at 605-08. The balancing test which Judge Choy used was actually designed to
resolve the jurisdictional issue. Judge Choy balanced (1) whether the alleged restraint affected or was intended to affect United States foreign commerce; (2) whether the alleged
restraint was of the type and magnitude recognized as a violation of the Sherman Act; and (3)
whether the Sherman Act should be applied as a matter of international comity and fairness.
Id. at 613. Some commentators have suggested that this balancing test be applied to the issue
of whether act of state should be applied. See, e.g., Comment, The Pitfalls of Act of State
Analysis in the Antitrust Context: A Critique of Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 749 773-74 (1976); Note, IAM v. OPEC: The Demise of the Restrictive Theory of
Sovereign Immunity & of the ExtraterritorialEffect of the Sherman Act Against Foreign
Sovereigns, 41 U. PrrT. L. REv. 841, 857 (1980); Recent Decision, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 321,
334-35 (1978).
46. 549 F.2d at 607. See also 376 U.S. at 428.
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47
The court ruled that the act of state doctrine did not apply,
reasoning that a "sovereign act" exists when the sovereign government has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests. 48 The Honduran government had not been named as a
party. 49 The Honduran court proceedings were not "sovereign
acts" within the meaning of the defense 5 and therefore, the justification for judicial abstention was weak.5 1
Another recent antitrust case in which a balancing test was
employed is Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 52 The
plaintiff, Mannington, alleged that the defendant secured foreign
patents by fraud and thus violated the United States antitrust
laws. 53 The district court invoked the act of state doctrine and
dismissed the action.5 4 The circuit court disagreed and remanded
55
for the development of an adequate record.
The defendant, relying on the act of state defense, argued that
a foreign patent could only be granted by "affirmative governmental actions"5 and therefore was an act of state. 57 The circuit court
stated:

The grant of patents for floor coverings is not the type of sovereign activity that would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct of international affairs. Although
enforcement of a decree in the present litigation may possibly
present problems of international relations ...the granting of
the patents per se, in substance ministerial activity, is not the
kind of governmental action contemplated by the act of state
doctrine ....58

While not specifically rejecting Hunt, the opinion rejects
Hunt's rigid approach in favor of the more flexible balancing ap-

47. 549 F.2d at 608.
48. Id. at 607-08.
49. Id. at 608.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
53. Id. at 1290. Mannington sued Congoleum on the grounds that Congoleum had
fraudulently received patents. Mannington alleged that Congoleum had made false statements concerning test data, United States patent applications and reaction and performance
of some chemical compounds of vinyl. Id.
54. Id. at 1290.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1293.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 1294.
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proach.5 9 The balancing tests used in Timberlane and Mannington
Mills necessarily address the interests underlying the act of state
doctrine while the Hunt approach disregards them. Nevertheless,
Hunt remains viable.60 Timberlane and Mannington Mills merely
demonstrate that the courts are amenable to the use of balancing
tests even though they tend to extend the courts' analyses.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The first articulation of the defense of foreign sovereign immunity by a United States court was in 1812. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon6 l the Court upheld the French government's
plea of immunity in an action against France for the attachment
and repossession of a sailing vessel. 6 2 By granting France "absolute" immunity, McFaddon reflected the policy of protecting the

59. Id. Again, the balancing test employed in Mannington Mills was used to resolve the
jurisdictional issue. The court balanced the following factors:
(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties; (3)
Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad; (4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (5)
Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; (6)
Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief; (7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its order effective; (9)
Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances (10) Whether a treaty with the affected
nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to Timberlane and Mannington Mills, one other international antitrust case
has criticized Hunt. In Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), the court held that the refusal of the Indonesian
Department of Forestry to issue a timber cutting permit to the plaintiff did not amount to an
act of state. Id. at 55-56. The court found no special factors which would outbalance the
United States' interest in reaching the anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 53. "Precluding all
inquiry into the motivation behind or circumstances surrounding the sovereign act would
uselessly thwart legitimate American goals where adjudication would result in no embarrassment to executive department action." Id. at 55. Thus, Mitsui rejected both Hunt's general
approach to act of state and its approach on the motivational issue.
60. There has been no Supreme Court decision overruling Hunt in favor of the balancing approach. The two approaches are currently competing for supremacy. For commentators criticizing Hunt, see, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 97, 113-15 (1978) and 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 321,
328 (1978).
61. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
62. Id.
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equality, territorial independence and dignity of foreign govern-

ments .63
The "absolute" theory was consistent with the prevailing conception of the sovereign in 1812. At that time, it was believed that
sovereignty was embodied in figureheads who would be offended
by actions which impinged upon their personal dignity and power.
As the concept of sovereignty changed, so did the concept of foreign
sovereign immunity and its underlying policies.6 4 Commentators
have noted, "[c]omplex and impersonal bureaucracies whose effectiveness [did] not depend on the inviolability of their national dignity and honor"65 replaced the personal government."" This shift
to an "impersonal" government redirected the focus of the foreign
sovereign immunities defense, concentrating on the protection 6of7
foreign governments from harassing and interfering litigation.
This new policy focus changed the applicability of the defense
because only public fuctions were given immunity.
In 1952, the United States adopted this "restrictive" theory of
foreign sovereign immunity as embodied in the so-called Tate Letter.68 This shift in policy was based on the principle of reciprocity,
the need for protection of individuals who entered into commercial
undertakings with foreign sovereigns, the erosion of sovereign immunity domestically and the general international trend toward
adopting the "restrictive" theory.69 Unfortunately, the Tate Letter

63. Id. at 147. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity,
50 FoRnHAM L. Rsv. 155, 164 (1982). The "absolute" theory of foreign sovereign immunity
completely protects the foreign government from suit, regardless of the nature or purpose of
the transaction from which the suit arose. The sovereign, therefore, can only be sued with its
consent. See generally Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. Rsv. 1, 5-8 (1976); Note, supra note 47,
at 844; Recent Development, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 146, 147 (1977).
64. Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A FurtherInquiry, 11 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 193 (1980).
65. Hill, supra note 63, at 193.
66. Cooper, supra note 64, at 199.
67. Hill, supra note 63, at 165. See also Comment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive
Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns, 51 VA. L. REV. 316, 321-24 (1965).
68. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to the
Acting Attorney General, reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
69. Cooper, supra note 64, at 201.
(1) the trend in other countries toward the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity;
(2) principles of reciprocity-since the United States did not claim immunity in
foreign courts in contract or tort, the U.S. should deny immunity to foreign sovereigns in similar instances; (3) the erosion of sovereign immunity in domestic courts;
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did not provide the courts with guidelines for applying the "restrictive" theory. 70 Often this led the courts to defer to the State
Department for guidance when applying foreign sovereign immunity in a given situation. 7' The defense became more politically

than legally based.

2

The political influence often led to inconsist-

ent decisions regarding the granting or withholding of immunity. 73 As one commentator suggested, "[the courts] saw themselves bound by the policy enunciated in the [Tate Letter], but were
unable to extract therefrom any specific principles to guide their
decisions. ' 74 While the courts were aware of the reasons for the
policy shift, the lack of direction from the Legislative Branch, and
Executive interference in the application of the defense, created
more problems than the Tate Letter solved.
Congress resolved these problems by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 75 which codifies the "restrictive" theory and ensures that all decisions involving the granting or
withholding of immunity will be made on a legal rather than a
political basis. 76 The FSIA explicitly established the "restrictive"
theory of sovereign immunity as United States law,7 7 terminated
the State Department's role in the application of the defense, 78
established jurisdictional rules for its application, 79 and provided
(4) the need of individuals who enter commercial undertakings with a government
for a forum for resolution of disputes; (5) "[t]he reasons which obviously motivate
state trading countries in adhering to the [absolute] theory with perhaps increasing
rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should [adopt the restrictive
theory] ......
Id. (footnote omitted).
70. Hill, supra note 63, at 176. See Tate Letter, supra note 68.
71. Hill, supra note 63, at 176; Timberg, supra note 65, at 8-13; Editorial Comments,
Sovereign Immunity - The Case of the "Imias, " 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1974).
72. Letter to the Speaker, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6634-35
[hereinafter cited as Letter to the Speaker]. See also Tate Letter, supra note 68.
73. The political influence of the State Department led to situations in which immunity
was granted in clearly commercial cases. See, e.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). In addition, immunity was granted in some cases after the foreign government had waived it. See, e.g., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
74. Hill, supra note 63, at 176.
75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f) & 1601-11(1976).
76. Letter to the Speaker, supra note 72, at 6634.
77. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603, 1605-07 (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12-14, 16-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6611-13, 661421 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
79. See House Report, supra note 77, at 8, 12-14, 23-26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws at 6606, 6610-12, 6621-25.
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for execution of judgments on foreign property. 80 The FSIA does
not extend immunity to any situation
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States. 8 '

The question which most frequently arises in the assertion of
foreign sovereign immunity is whether a given action is public or
private in nature. The FSIA provided the "nature of the course of
conduct"8 2 standard which has subsequently been interpreted by
the courts. Private actions are those which both the government
and the private sector can perform. Public actions, on the other
hand, can only be performed by the government.8 3 Thus, levying
taxes to raise capital would be a public function while the securing
and repaying of a loan for a similar purpose would be a private
action.8 4 While this distinction seems straightforward, it appears
that courts can manipulate the facts of a case in order to achieve the
desired result. A comparison of International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC 85 with Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Pezetel8 6 illustrates this point.
In OPEC, IAM sued OPEC for price fixing in violation of the
Sherman Act. 87 OPEC maintained the price of oil by regulating
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a); House Report, supra note 77, at 7-8, 26-31, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6605-06, 6624-30.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
83. For cases endorsing this approach, see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, (C.D. Cal. 1979), afJ'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), appeal docketed,
No. 81-645 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981).
84. Compare National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig. 448 F. Supp. 622, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (foreign government's breach of a letter
of credit agreement is a commercial act) with Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp.
1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (nationalization of oil is a
non-commercial act).
85. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal 1979), af-'d, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), appealdocketed,
No. 81-645 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1981).
86. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
87. 477 F. Supp. at 558-59. OPEC consisted of thirteen member nations which either
owned or actively participated in the management of firms which produced and exported oil.
649 F.2d at 1355.
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the amount of crude oil leaving the respective member countries
and by engaging in its own production and export operations.'8 The
district court ruled that OPEC's activities were essentially public in
nature and therefore immune from suit under the FSIA. "[T]he
nature of the activity engaged in by each of these OPEC member
countries is the establishment by a sovereign state of the terms and
conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource-to wit, crude
oil-from its territory."8 9 The court reasoned that "[t]he defendants' control over their oil resources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-producing
resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples. '" The
court explained its view of OPEC's operation, stating that the
"governmental nature [of the regulatory activity] does not change
merely because the medium through which the activity is accomplished has changed." 9' Thus, the public nature of the regulatory
activity was extended to the essentially private production activities
and bootstrapped the production activities into the protection of
foreign sovereign immunity.
Several commentators have taken issue with the district court's
finding of immunity.92 They argue that the cartel's acts were
obviously commercial and therefore a proper subject of suit.9 3 To
support this criticism, they rely on a House Report which explicitly
states: "'a regular course of commercial conduct' includes the carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a mineral extraction
company, an airline, or a state trading corporation. '9 4 How then,
did the OPEC court come to the opposite conclusion?
The volatile Middle East situation in which the OPEC decision
was made seems to have been a major factor in the district court's
decision.9 5 While the FSIA shields the courts from the direct influ88.
F.2d at
89.
90.
91.

In addition, OPEC accomplished this without the aid of an enforcement arm. 649
1355.
477 F. Supp. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 568 n.14.
92. See, e.g., Crocker, Sovereign Immunity and the Suit Against OPEC, 12 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 215 (1980).
93. Id. at 226-27.
94. House Report, supra note 77, at 16, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6614-15 (emphasis added).
95. The court also relied heavily on general principles of international law which
establish the right of foreign sovereigns over their own natural resources. 477 F. Supp. at 56768. However, because the legislative history of the defense explicitly excludes natural resources from immunity, it is possible that the court merely couched its decision in interna-
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ence of the State Department, it cannot prevent, nor does it attempt to prevent, the court from including all relevant factors in its
decision. OPEC demonstrates how the political environment in
which a case is heard can affect the outcome. Although the FSIA
attempts to separate the legal and political spheres, OPEC seems to
have been decided more on a political basis than a legal basis. The
district court relied on the underlying policy considerations rather
than on a strict application of the defense.
The court regarded the regulation and production of crude oil
as an essential function of the OPEC governments. 9 The court
protected the OPEC governments from harassing and interfering
litigation by immunizing the cartel from IAM's claim. It is questionable, however, whether IAM's suit was brought merely to harass OPEC. In this light, perhaps the OPEC decision is better seen as
protecting FSIA's implicit policy of insuring the smooth operation
of United States foreign policy.9 7 The district court, faced with a
political decision far beyond its ability and resources to adjudicate,
declined to do so. This preserved the State Department's role as sole
arbiter of foreign policy and left an extremely complex political
situation to the Executive. 8 While this decision denied judicial
relief, it did not foreclose the possibility of political or diplomatic
relief. Thus, from an FSIA policy viewpoint, OPEC was correctly
decided.
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel,9 9 a United States golf
cart manufacturer sued a Polish golf cart manufacturer, "created
by and responsible to the Peoples Republic of Poland,"' 0 0 for restraining trade, conspiring to monopolize and importing at substantially below market price.' 0 ' The court ruled that the defendant
was engaged in a commercial activity and, therefore, was not
tional law terms while actually deciding the case on the basis of the prevailing political
environment.
96. 477 F. Supp. at 568.
97. OPEC essentially presents a separation of powers problem. This explains why the
circuit court decided the case on act of state grounds. The protection of the smooth operation
of United States foreign policy is a corollary to the separation of powers consideration and is
concerned primarily with the protection of long-term foreign relations. The FSIA was
enacted to protect the long term foreign policy considerations involved in the disposition of an
international case and, therefore, implicitly protects the smooth operation of foreign policy.
98. The circuit court was also concerned with this aspect of the litigation. 649 F.2d at
1360-61.
99. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
100. Id. at 388-89.
101. Id. at 390.
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immune from suit under the FSIA.10 2 The facts of Pezetel are
similar to those of OPEC. Both the Polish and OPEC governments
were engaged in commercial activities. The differences in the commodities and the political situations involved, however, may be the
key to understanding why the decisions came out differently. The
Pezetel court, unlike the OPEC court, was not faced with a highly
volatile political situation. Rather, Pezetel involved a relatively
unimportant commodity and a relatively stable political environment. The two cases may be reconciled by emphasizing the policies
underlying the FSIA and the prevailing political climates. OMC's
suit, like IAM's, was not brought merely to harass the defendant.
Yet, OMC succeeds where IAM failed because the court was not
faced with a difficult political decision. The court did not feel a
need to defer to the State Department or forego adjudication in
favor of a political or diplomatic remedy. Thus, the policy considerations behind the OPEC decision also function in Pezetel and explain the varied results.
C. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
The defense of foreign sovereign compulsion has been successfully asserted in only one antitrust case, Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo.10 3 In Texaco, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant oil companies had engaged in a group boycott to
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the oil crucial to its operation. 10 4 The defendants asserted that the Venezuelan government
forced them to cease dealing with the plaintiff. 0 5 The defendants
argued that because the Venezuelan government compelled their
actions, they were protected under the defense of foreign sovereign
compulsion. 0 6 The court held that the defendant proved compulsion by the Venezuelan government and had a complete defense to
the plaintiff's claim. 10 7 The court reasoned that "[w]ere compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a government
order would have to choose one country or the other in which to do
business. The Sherman Act does not go so far." 10 8 The court
102. Id. at 396.
103. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
104. Id. at 1292.
105. Id. at 1293.
106. Id. at 1294.
107. Id. at 1296. The court found that the defendants had held their concessions subject
to the Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons which had threatened to suspend the
defendants' right to export oil if the defendants dealt with the plaintiff. Id. at 1294.
108. Id. at 1298.
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supported the application of the defense, stating that "[o]nce governmental action is shown, further examination is neithernecessary
nor proper." 09 As noted above, the act of state doctrine bars any
inquiry into the validity of an act by a foreign sovereign." 0 The
applicability of the defense turns on the defendant's showing of
actual compulsion. Mere acquiescence, approval or delegation of
power by a government does not usually constitute compulsion."'
Some commentators suggest that the form of the compulsion is
irrelevant and that it can range from formal legislative decrees to
11 2
informal verbal communications.
The policy considerations behind foreign sovereign compulsion
3
are straightforward and overlap those of the act of state doctrine."
The major policy consideration at work in foreign sovereign compulsion is fairness to the defendant. 1 4 A defendant should not be
liable for violations of the antitrust laws that were compelled by a
foreign government. The second policy underlying the defense is
that by controlling commerce within their territories, foreign governments may require compliance with an anticompetitive regulation. In such a situation, enforcement of United States antitrust
laws would force the defendant to abandon trade within one of the
countries involved. The third policy underlying foreign sovereign
compulsion also supports the act of state defense, namely, that a
United States court will not sit in judgment on an act of foreign
sovereign. "If, of course, the defendants' activities had been required by [foreign] law, [the] court could indeed do nothing. A
United States court would have under such circumstances no right
to condemn the governmental activity of another sovereign na5
tion."'

109. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
111. 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
112. See B. HAWK, supra note 1, at 154.
113. See id. at 151-52.
114. See id. at 155.
115. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,600, 77,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
In addition, the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion is not effective if the defendants
induced the compelling conduct.
A fourth policy consideration is analogous to the "state action" exemption of Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). This case does not support the act of state doctrine or the defense
of foreign sovereign compulsion. Professor Hawk suggests that one of the Parker progeny,
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), does support the fairness consideration
underlying the sovereign compulsion defense. See HAWK, supra note 1, at 154.
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These underlying policies can be seen at work in Texaco. Once
the Texaco court found actual compulsion, the act of state policy
barred inquiry into the validity of the foreign act. The lack of
wrongful inducement of the action by the defendants1 6 and the
possibility of a detrimental effect on the defendants for non-compliance 1 17 led to the finding that fairness dictated that the defendants
be relieved of all liability.
II. IN RE URANIUM ANTITRUST LITIGATION
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation"8 provides an excellent
factual background for comparing the traditional separatist approach with an aggregate approach which emphasizes policy considerations and de-emphasizes the rigid application of rules. "9 In
Uranium Westinghouse brought an antitrust suit against twelve
foreign and seventeen domestic producers of uranium' 20 for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act ' 2' and section 73 of the Wilson
Tariff Act. 22 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged.in a conspiracy to restrain both foreign and domestic commerce in the United States. 2 3 Westinghouse also alleged the defendants' activities led to artificially high uranium prices forcing
Westinghouse to breach some of its contracts with third parties
because of the lack of uranium supply. 24 The defendants argued
that they had cartelized at the suggestion of their respective governments. 25 The foreign governments, as amicus curiaeclaimed that

116. 307 F. Supp. at 1297.
117. See supra note 107.
118. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11. 1979).
119. See infra notes 136-167 and accompanying text.
120. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382, 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
121. Westinghouse Complaint at 1, 44, In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. I11. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Westinghouse Complaint].
122. Id. at 44.
123. Id. at 19-40.
124. Id. at 41-44.
125. The defendants argued that foreign sovereign compulsion barred the plaintff's
claim. See, e.g., Answer of Gulf Oil Corp. at 26 In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Answer of Gulf Minerals Can.-, Ltd. at 24 Answer of Denison Mines,
Inc. at 9.
The Canadian government admittedly coordinated the cartel activities:
The Canadian Government first sought unsuccessfully to promote a joint producer/
consumer arrangement and subsequently initiated the discussions which led to an
informal marketing arrangement among non-U.S. producers. The Canadian Government took this initiative and secured compliance of Canadian producers with the
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they had encouraged the cartel in reaction to a United States ura26
nium embargo.1
The case before Judge Marshall was concerned with discovery
issues. 127 However, his attitude toward discovery indicates that he
would have taken a strict approach to the application of the de28
fenses had the litgation reached the merits of the case.1
The defense of foreign sovereign immunity was mechanically
unavailable to the Uranium defendants because none of them was a
terms of the arrangement because it was convinced that preservation of a viable
uranium producing industry was essential to the Canadian national interest in the
light of projections of future uranium requirements. The long history of close
Canadian Government involvement in and regulation of the uranium resource
industry through stockpiling, export licences and other measures clearly establishes
the degree to which the Government regards the industry as vital to Canadian
interests and the importance it consequently attaches to industry compliance with
Government policy respecting uranium marketing.
Diplomatic Note (No. ECP-25) from Hon. Donald Jamieson, Secretary of State for External
Affairs of Canada to Hon. Thomas Enders, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, November 8, 1978,
reprinted in Memorandum of Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, Att. D. p.2., In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11.
1979) (filed May 21, 1979).
126. The Canadian government also explained that its actions were in response to the
United States embargo on foreign uranium:
The problems of the Canadian uranium industry were accentuated in August
1964 when President Johnson signed into law the Private Ownership of Special
Nuclear Materials Act. One of the provisions of this Act permitted domestic and
foreign uranium customers to use the government (USAEC) owned enrichment
facilities. However, as a means of protecting the domestic US uranium industry, the
Act made provision to exclude foreign uranium enriched in the facilities from US
markets. When the USAEC formally established in 1966 its criteria for enrichment
services, foreign producers had been effectively barred from competing in the US
market (which represented at that time 70% of the "free world" market).
Press Release from Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Sept. 22,
1976, reprinted in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Dusquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3, 11
(1978).
127. Westinghouse had requested the production of various documents located in foreign countries. The district court ordered the production of the documents and required all
parties to comply or file restated objections specifying and particularizing the objection to
compliance based on foreign blocking statutes. Ten defendants raised foreign law objections.
Westinghouse moved for production orders pursuant to FEn. R. Civ. P. 37(a) against the ten
non-producers.
Of the five blocking statutes involved, only the Canadian, Australian and South African
laws were of any consequence. Generally, these laws prohibited the production of any
documents relating to uranium activities. Each statute was enacted or modified just prior to
the litigation for the express purpose of frustrating the United States' jurisdiction over the
foreign defendants. Finally, each statute imposed criminal liability for non-compliance. 480
F. Supp. 1143.
128. The plaintiff argued that the court should follow a two-step procedure for compelling production and imposing saction. Id. at 1144. The defendants argued that the court
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government entity or instrumentality. When the court rejected the
defense, it did not discuss the smooth operation of United States
foreign policy or the need to protect foreign governments from
harassing and interfering litigation.
The court's decision at the discovery stage regarding the act of
state doctrine leaves no doubt as to how it would have ruled if the
defense were raised with regard to the substantive issues. Several
defendants urged that the issuance of the requested production
orders was barred by the act of state because such orders would
"interfere with the conduct of our foreign relations by the Executive
Branch. '12 The court ruled that the doctrine was inapplicable
because the plaintiff had not challenged the validity of the foreign
sovereign acts blocking discovery but rather, conceding their validity, had questioned whether they excused the defendants from complying with a production order. 130 Once the court decided that the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable, the policies underlying the
defense were never explored. Judge Marshall's refusal to engage in

should examine all relevant factors in determining whether the orders should issue. Id. Judge
Marshall ruled that
[o]nce personal jurisdiction over the person and control over the documents by the
person are present, a United States court has power to order production of the
documents. The existence of a conflicting foreign law which prohibits the disclosure
of the requested documents does not prevent the exercise of this power.
Id. at 1145.
Judge Marshall explicitly rejected any balancing test, stating:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority,
to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a balancing
test is inherently unworkable. . . .The competing interests here display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy. Westinghouse seeks to
enforce this nation's antitrust laws against an alleged international marketing arrangement among uranium producers, and to that end has sought documents
located in foreign countries where those producers conduct their business. In specific
response to this and other related litigation in the American courts, three foreign
governments have enacted non-disclosure legislation which is aimed at nullifying
the impact of American antitrust legislation by prohibiting access to those same
documents. It is simply impossible to judicially "balance"these totally contradictory
and mutually negating actions.
Id. at 1148 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1149.
130. Id. Judge Marshall's order actually does challenge the validity of the foreign
blocking statutes. By postponing the discussion of the foreign law until the sanction stage of
the litigation, and ordering production, the court implicitly states that the blocking statutes
could be circumvented, while the Sherman Act could not. This seems to indicate that Judge
Marshall considers the Sherman Act to be somehow "more valid" than the foreign laws.
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any policy analysis ignores the separation of powers consideration
13
involved in the act of state defense. 1
The defense of foreign sovereign compulsion was also asserted 32 but was not addressed by the court. By postponing its
consideration of the defense until the sanction stage of the litigation
Judge Marshall implicitly rejected the defense.1 33 Arguably, the
defendants could have met the requirements of the defense in the
discovery stage because they were actually compelled by the foreign
governments not to disclose the requested information. 34 Substantively, however, the defendants were not compelled to cartelize and
therefore, would not have been protected by the defense. 13" Nevertheless, Judge Marshall's failure to consider the defense of foreign
sovereign compulsion resulted in the loss of the defense's major
policy consideration, fairness.
In conclusion, the difficulty with a mechanistic application of
the antitrust defenses in Uranium would be the loss of interests
which would result if the court was permitted to exercise its power
without considering all of the implications of its decision. In the
Uranium situation, the separatist approach does not protect all of
the policies underlying the defenses and therefore, does not adequately protect the defendants.
III. THE AGGREGATE APPROACH
It has recently been suggested that, because there is no significant policy overlap among the three defenses, "there is good reason
to resist collapsing the doctrines into one another or discarding
some of them entirely.' 36 Actually, this lack of policy overlap
among the defenses is the reason they should be aggregated. By so
doing the courts can insure that the defenses will function more
efficiently and fairly. The separatist approach functions in the
majority of situations. There are unusual cases such as Uranium,
however, in which the approach fails. In these cases, the aggregate
approach would function to protect the policies whose benefits
would otherwise be lost. The remainder of this Comment will
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 125.
See 480 F. Supp. at 1149.
See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
Id. See supra note 125.
Comment, supra note 4, at 656.
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elaborate on the policy problems in Uranium, posit an aggregate
approach to remedy those problems, and demonstrate how such an
approach might function.
Judge Marshall's failure to explore the policies underlying the
defense of foreign sovereign immunity resulted in an absence of
important considerations from the decision, namely the smooth
operation of United States foreign policy and protection of foreign
governments from harassing and interfering litigation. 3 7 While
the latter policy was not a factor in Uranium, 38 the former should
have been because as that case demonstrated, the smooth operation
of United States foreign policy can be endangered even though a
foreign government is not directly involved in the suit. The smooth
operation of foreign policy is closely related to the separation of
powers consideration.139 While a separation of powers analysis is
primarily concerned with immediate foreign policy considerations,
the smooth operation of foreign policy consideration is concerned
with the effect that the court's decision might have on future foreign relations.140 In determining whether it is appropriate for the

137. See supra notes 63-103 and accompanying text.
138. Since none of the parties involved in Uranium was a foreign state or instrumentality of a foreign state, the court did not have to concern itself with whether the litigation was
harassing or interfering. If, however, a foreign sovereign were a party to the litigation, it
would be interesting to hypothesize how the Uranium court would have handled the analysis.
Since the Uranium court took a strict formulistic approach to the act of state doctrine, it
is safe to assume that its approach to the foreign sovereign immunity defense would also be
formulistic. The court would have closely adhered to FSIA and held that since the foreign
government was engaged in a commercial activity (i.e., operating a mineral extraction
company) it was not immune from suit under the FSIA of 1976. It is highly doubtful that the
Uranium court would take the OPEC district court approach and rule that since the regulation of the industry was essentially a public governmental function, the nature of the action
does not change because the medium through which it is accomplished changes. Thus, the
sovereign defendant would not be liable for the creation or operation of the cartel because it
was merely a vehicle by which the defendant accomplished an essentially public goal. The
Uranium court would probably have denied immunity on the ground tht the foreign defendant's act was specifically excluded from immunity by the legislative history of FSIA. See supra
note 106 and accompanying text. Under the current individualistic approach and the circumstances of the case as posited by the hypothetical, the decision to deny immunity would
probably have been correct.
While the issue of whether the plaintiff's suit is harassing was not present in Uranium, it
is nevertheless an important consideration. The plaintiff's intentions in bringing the suit could
bear heavily upon the court's decision to grant or deny immunity. Thus, a court could, under
the finding that the suit was merely to harass the defendant, grant immunity in a clearly
commercial case and deny imunity in a non-commercial case.
139. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
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court to decide the case, these long-term considerations are as sig4
nificant as the immediate policy impact of the decision.' '
The Uranium court's approach to the act of state doctrine
significantly jeopardized the position of the defendants and failed to
consider the separation of powers policy underlying the defense. As
illustrated by the circuit court decision in OPEC, separation of
powers serves to protect the Executive from political embarrassment and, more importantly, safeguards the Executive's bargaining
position and credibility in delicate foreign policy matters. 42 In
OPEC, separation of powers restrained the court from adjudicating
a claim in which any remedy granted to the plaintiff could have,
and in all probability would have, led to significant economic
harm. 143 In addition, the risk of retaliation from the OPEC countries was substantial. 144 The risk of retaliation outweighed the
need to provide the plaintiff with a remedy. 45 "The basic premise
of the analysis, that it is not good policy to exercise judicial authority where adjudication would do more general harm than good,
seems unassailable. 1 46 This policy, while clearly at work in
OPEC, is absent from Uranium.
While the foreign policy problems presented in Uranium were
not of the same magnitude as those in OPEC the separation of
powers analysis should not have been ignored. 147 The court should
have inquired into the issue of whether an adjudication could have
led to more general harm than good. Fortunately, in this instance,
the potential political ramifications of the decision were minimal.
Canada, France, Australia and South Africa would not take severe
retaliatory measures against the United States merely because of an
48
adverse decision.
141. See infra note 148.
142. See supra note 99.
143. This premise is based upon the impact of the 1973 embargo. For a further discussion of the use of oil as a weapon by the OPEC nations, see generally Paust & Blavstein, The
Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to InternationalPeace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974).
144. Since oil is the sole weapon of OPEC, it is not difficult to imagine that it would be
used in this situation.
145. See infra note 145.
146. Comment, supra note 4, at 652.
147. The reason for this is explained, infra note 148.
148. While it may be true that Canada, France, Australia or South Africa would not
take severe retaliatory action against the United States, it is not true, as the Uranium court
implied, that close allies will not take some measure to protect themselves against United
States antitrust laws. The Uranium decision to order the production of the documents despite
the foreign blocking statutes implicitly suggests that the smooth operation of foreign policy
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The Uranium decision disregards the role of the executive
branch in foreign policy matters by failing to recognize that it may
will not be affected when the parties before the court are allies. In light of the events which
followed the Uranium decision, this belief was categorically incorrect.
One of the most decisive responses to the Uranium decision was Britain's passing of the
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (UK), reprintedin Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 959, F-I to F-2 (April 10, 1980). PTIA provides for the "clawing" back of the
punitive portion of a foreign judgement. Id. § 6(1).
[T]he qualifying defendant shall be entitled to recover from the party in whose
favour the judgment was given so much of the amount referred to in subsection (1)
above as exceeds the part attributable to compensation; and that part shall be taken
to be such part of the amount as bears to the whole of it the same proportion as the
sum assessed by the court that gave the judgment as compensation for the loss or
damage sustained by that party bears to the whole of the damages awarded to that
party.
Id. § 6(2). In other words, a British defendant can, under the PTIA, recover the amount
equal to two thirds of the entire award against him. Clearly, this action amounts to a type of
retaliation against the United States' extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. The
British have armed themselves against United States antitrust liability. The passage of PTIA
suggests that even close American allies will confront the United States on antitrust issues.
Such a confrontation cannot lead to improved relations but may only serve to create a strain
on the intergovernmental relationship. For an excellent analysis of PTIA see Note, The
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 - Britain's Latest Weapon in the Fight Against
United States Antitrust Laws, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 341 (1981).
In addition to Great Britain's latest action, Canada has also taken steps to enact a similar
statute. "The Foreign Proceedings and Judgments Bill" would prevent enforcement of foreign
antitrust judgments in Canada when the Canadian Attorney General considers the enforcement of such judgment to be harmful to Canadian international trade and commerce.
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 979, at A-5 to A-6 (Aug. 28, 1980). The Canadian
sentiment towards the extraterritorial application of foreign laws is best summed up by
Justice Mininster Jean Chr~tien.
With the proliferation of multinational corporations, many countries have legitimate claims to jurisdiction over the activities of these multinational entities. However, we feel that it is improper for a country to attempt to extend its jurisdiction to
lawful activities which occur outside its territory.
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 973, at A-20 (July 17, 1980).Chr~tien singled out the
United States' enforcement activities in the Uranium situation. "In our view, it is objectionable that actions of the Canadian uranium industry, taken outside the United States in
accordance with Canadian law in response to a declared national policy, should be the
subject of legal proceedings in the United States."Id.
Finally, the international reaction to the United States' intrusion upon foreign sovereignty has not been isolated in the antitrust area. In 1973, Canada passed the Foreign
Investment Review Act (FIRA), ch. 46, 1973-74 Can. Stat., as amended by ch. 52, 1976-77
Can. Stat. 82. FIRA limits the availability of foreign investment opportunities in Canada.
Since the United States is Canada's number one trading partner, this placed a severe limitation upon American investors' ability to directly invest in Canadian businesses.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the smooth operation of foreign policy is a key
factor in any international litigation analysis, and especially in the antitrust context since
there is always the possibility of a large treble damage award. The Uranium court's approach
to this factor is clearly erroneous. While close allies will not retaliate on a grand scale, the
statutes briefly discussed illustrate that difficulties in long term international relations can
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have been better equipped to supply a remedy than the court. 49 A
more comprehensive approach, such as that posited in Timberlane,150 would have expressly addressed this problem. It is quite
possible that under the Timberlane analysis, the Uranium court
would have reached the identical result as it did through its formulistic approach. Nevertheless, the court's failure to engage in such
an analysis clearly resulted in the loss of defendants' interest.
Finally, by refusing to consider the defense of foreign sovereign
compulsion, the underlying policy consideration of fairness escaped
the court's analysis. Under the circumstances, fairness would seem
to indicate that the defendants should prevail. The defendants
cartelized at the behest of the foreign governments who sought to
protect the uranium producers from the adverse affects of the
United States embargo.' 5 ' The cartel was formed pursuant to the
important energy policies of the involved governments. 5 2 Fairness
also indicates that cartelization in self-defense should not be actionable. This analysis would change if the cartel had not been formed
in response to a United States embargo. The Uranium court did not
engage in this type of analysis and thus, the policy was unexamined
and unprotected.
A possible solution to avoiding the interest loss occasioned by
the separatist approach would be to aggregate the individual policies underlying each defense into a single analysis. Such an analysis
would only be employed after the separate application of each
defense failed to protect the defendant. The aggregate approach
would ensure that all of the policies underlying the defenses were
carefully analyzed before the defendant was subjected to antitrust
liability. Individually, each defense acts as a complete defense to
liability. 5 3 The aggregrate approach, however, could either act as
a complete defense or present mitigating circumstances which
would reduce liability. 54 This dual nature is the result of the ad
hoc application of the approach. A court following the aggregate

arise because a court imprudently disregarded an analysis of the impact that its decision
would have on United States international relations.
149. See 376 U.S. at 423; 649 F.2d at 1358.
150. 549 F.2d at 613. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 125.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 10, 81 & 107 and accompanying text.
154. The reduction in liability would decrease the initial amount of the award. It would
definitely not prevent a court from trebling that amount because judicial discretion with
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approach would apply the following factors to the specific facts
before it in determining whether the defendant has a complete
defense or has presented mitigating circumstances:
1. Whether a foreign government is involved and to what exor has passed
tent. (i.e. whether the government is a party
55
legislation significantly affecting the case).1
2. If a foreign government is involved, the56 extent to which its
actions affected those of the defendant.
the
3. The extent to which the alleged conduct interferes with
57
domestic and foreign commerce of the United States.1
4. Whether the separation of powers consideration suggests that
more general harm than good in
an adjudication would do
58
the context of the case.1
5. Whether it is feasible for the plaintiff to obtain diplomatic
relief if the court denies judicial relief. 15
6. Whether the adjudication of the case will have a severe effect
0
on the smooth operation of United States foreign policy.
6
7. A general notion of fairness under the circumstances. '
62
International comity would also be considered.1
In applying these criteria to the facts of Uranium, the court
would have to engage in the following analysis. Although the foreign governments were not named as parties, their conduct significantly affected the defendants' actions. The uranium cartel was a
self-defense measure rather than merely an attempt to control the
market. These factors coupled with the insubstantial effect of
United States commerce, weigh against adjudicating the case. On

regard to whether or not to treble the damage award could lead to discriminatory and
inconsistent practices.
155. This factor is related to foreign sovereign compulsion. See supra notes 103-17 and
accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
157. The effect upon economics and competition within the United States is the basis of
the antitrust laws. In support of this proposition see, supra note 2.
158. This factor is related to the act of state doctrine. See supra notes 20-28 and
accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
160. This factor is a product of the foreign sovereign immunity defense. See supra notes
103-17 and accompanying text.
161. This factor finds its basis in the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. See supra
notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
162. Although international comity has been de-emphasized by the courts, its recognition is still important. See supra note 147.
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the other hand, the separation of powers consideration is not a
major factor in Uranium because the countries involved are close
allies. Therefore, there is little risk of severe economic retaliation.
The smooth operation of United States foreign policy consideration
would seem to indicate that an adjudication would not severely
hamper United States foreign relations with the countries involved. 6 3 These factors tend to weigh in favor of adjudication.
Under these circumstances, fairness to the plaintiff would dictate
that the defendants be denied a complete defense. Westinghouse
was injured, albeit by a defensive rather than offensive measure.
Nevertheless, fairness would indicate that Westinghouse should recover while the defendants should be permitted to use the mitigat6 4
ing circumstances to reduce their liability. 1
In practice, the major difficulty with the aggregate approach
is that it requires the defendants to argue policy rather than law.
This, however, is not unusual in antitrust litigation. 1 5 Areeda and
Turner have suggested, "[p]erhaps the one point that deserves to be
stressed for the future is that the substantive antitrust analysis must
not be applied mechanically where foreign contacts are involvednot even in the so called per se area. More subtlety is required
.... 166ll Practically, under the aggregate approach, the defendant would plead the policies underlying each defense after pleading
each defense separately.
CONCLUSION
The strict separatist approach which has thus far dominated
the field of international antitrust is incomplete. It leads to the loss
of vital interest and permits liability where none should issue. To
permit this to continue would be an egregious loss to both the
defendants and the system in general.167 If the United States is
going to continue to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, it

163. But see supra note 148.
164. See supra note 153.
165. Excellent examples of this blurred distinction occur in cases employing the rule of
reason. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d.
930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Realty Multilist, Inc., 1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,
624 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 240 at 278 (1978).
167. If the policies are not upheld, the system suffers as much as the defendant.
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must continue to develop rules which encompass a myriad of policy
considerations. The aggregate approach to the defenses of act of
state, foreign sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign compulsion
frees the courts from the strict adherence to the separatist approach
and protects all of the policies underlying each defense.
Anthony C. Acampora

